SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
LESTER BENJAMIN S.
HALILI, G.R. No. 165424
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CORONA,
- v
e r s u s - VELASCO,
JR.,*
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO and
PERALTA,** JJ.
CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI
and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. Promulgated:
June 9,
2009
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R E S O L U T I
O N
CORONA, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the April 16,
2008 resolution of this Court denying petitioner’s petition for review on
certiorari (under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court). The petition sought to set
aside the January 26, 2004 decision[1] and September
24, 2004 resolution[2] of the
Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 60010.
Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare
his marriage to respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of
his psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158.
He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it
was a “joke.” After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and
wife, but maintained the relationship. However, they started fighting
constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing
respondent and started dating other women. Immediately thereafter, he received
prank calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a married
man. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was
not “fake.”
Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a
mixed personality disorder, particularly dependent and self-defeating
personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan.
The court a quo held that petitioner’s personality disorder
was serious and incurable and directly affected his capacity to comply with his
essential marital obligations to respondent. It thus declared the marriage null
and void.[3]
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial
court on the ground that the totality of the evidence presented failed to
establish petitioner’s psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration. It was denied.
The case was elevated to this Court via a petition for review
under Rule 45. We affirmed the CA’s decision and resolution upholding the
validity of the marriage.
Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating
his argument that his marriage to respondent ought to be declared null and void
on the basis of his psychological incapacity. He stressed that the evidence he
presented, especially the testimony of his expert witness, was more than enough
to sustain the findings and conclusions of the trial court that he was and still
is psychologically incapable of complying with the essential obligations of
marriage.
We grant the motion for reconsideration.
In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the
Republic of the Philippines,[4] this
Court reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on psychological
incapacity (as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a
case-to-case basis — guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church
tribunals.
Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature of Article 36,
courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must
consider as essential the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
disposition of the parties.[5]
In this case, the testimony[6] of
petitioner’s expert witness revealed that petitioner was suffering from
dependent personality disorder. Thus:
Q. Dr. Dayan, going back to the examinations and
interviews which you conducted, can you briefly tell this court your findings
[and] conclusions?
A. Well, the petitioner is
suffering from a personality disorder. It is a mixed personality
disorder from self-defeating personality disorder to [dependent]
personality disorder and this is brought about by [a] dysfunctional
family that petitioner had. He also suffered from partner relational problem
during his marriage with Chona. There were lots of fights and it was not truly
a marriage, sir.
Q. Now, what made you conclude that Lester is
suffering from psychological incapacity to handle the essential obligations of
marriage?
A. Sir, for the reason that his motivation for
marriage was very questionable. It was a very impulsive decision. I don’t think
he understood what it meant to really be married and after the marriage, there
was no consummation, there was no sexual intercourse, he never lived with the
respondent. And after three months he refused to see or talk with the
respondent and afterwards, I guess the relationship died a natural death, and
he never thought it was a really serious matter at all.
xx xx xx
Q. Likewise, you stated here in your evaluation
that Lester Halili and respondent suffered from a grave lack of discretionary
judgment. Can you expound on this?
A. xx xx I don’t think they truly
appreciate the civil [rites which] they had undergone. [It was] just a spur of
the moment decision that they should get married
xx xx I don’t think they truly considered
themselves married.
xx xx xx
Q. Now [from] what particular portion of their
marriage were you able to conclude xx xx that
petitioner and respondent are suffering from psychological incapacity?
A. xx xx they
never lived together[.] [T]hey never had a residence, they never consummated
the marriage. During the very short relationship they had, there were frequent
quarrels and so there might be a problem also of lack of respect [for] each
other and afterwards there was abandonment.
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality
disorder[7] as
[a] personality disorder
characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals
usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear
criticism and are easily hurt by others’ comments. At times they actually bring
about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality
disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder
may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from
others, may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as
where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are
wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own,
volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other
people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied
with fears of being abandoned.
In her psychological report,[8] Dr.
Dayan stated that petitioner’s dependent personality disorder was evident in
the fact that petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended on
them for decisions.[9] Petitioner’s
mother even had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt
confused on what action to take upon learning that his marriage to respondent
was for real.[10]
Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of persons
suffering from a dependent personality disorder, petitioner typically acted in
a self-denigrating manner and displayed a self-defeating
attitude. This submissive attitude encouraged other people to take
advantage of him.[11] This
could be seen in the way petitioner allowed himself to be dominated, first, by
his father who treated his family like robots[12] and,
later, by respondent who was as domineering as his father.[13] When
petitioner could no longer take respondent’s domineering ways, he preferred to
hide from her rather than confront her and tell her outright that he wanted to
end their marriage.[14]
Dr. Dayan traced petitioner’s personality disorder to his
dysfunctional family life, to wit:[15]
Q. And what might be the
root cause of such psychological incapacity?
A. Sir, I mentioned
awhile ago that Lester’s family is dysfunctional. The father was very abusive,
very domineering. The mother has been very unhappy and the children never had
affirmation. They might [have been] x x x given financial support because the
father was [a] very affluent person but it was never an intact family. x x x
The wife and the children were practically robots. And so, I would say Lester
grew up, not having self-confidence, very immature and somehow not truly
understand[ing] what [it] meant to be a husband, what [it] meant to have a real
family life.
Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioner’s personality
disorder was grave and incurable and already existent at the time of the
celebration of his marriage to respondent.[16]
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a
psychological condition that was grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted
cause. This Court, in the same Tecase, recognized that individuals
with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and
thus therapy may be long-term.[17] Particularly,
personality disorders are “long-standing, inflexible ways of behaving that are
not so much severe mental disorders as dysfunctional styles of living. These
disorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in childhood or
adolescence, create problems for those who display them and for others.”[18]
From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed
suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively renders him unable to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, the
motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The April
16, 2008 resolution of this Court and the January 26,
2004 decision and September 24, 2004 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010 are SET ASIDE.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City,
Branch 158 dated April 17, 1998 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate
Justice Associate
Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
* Additional
member per raffle dated May 27, 2009.
** Additional
member in lieu of Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario per Special Order No. 653
dated June 1, 2009.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Godardo A. Jacinto
(retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion
(dismissed from the service) and Lucas P. Bersamin of the Former Fourth
Division of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 10-20.
[2] Id., pp. 22-24.
[3] Decision
penned by Judge Jose R. Hernandez. Id., pp. 106-109.
[4] G.R.
No. 161793, 13 February 2009, p. 25. See Salita v. Magtolis,
G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994, 233 SCRA 100, citing Sempio-Diy,
Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1988, p. 37. Although the
case pertained mainly to a petition to declare the parties’ marriage as null
and void on the ground of psychological incapacity of one of them, this Court,
however, did not rule on the issue as the assigned error in the petition for
review filed in this Court dealt with rules of procedure.
See also Santos v. CA, et al., 310 Phil. 21, 36,
(1995), which reiterated the above cited principle.
[5] Id.,
pp. 28-29, citing Archbishop Oscar V. Cruz, D.D. of the Archdiocese of
Lingayen-Dagupan, who explained in the Marriage Tribunal Ministry,
1992 ed., that “[s]tandard practice shows the marked advisability of [e]xpert
intervention in [m]arriage [c]ases accused of nullity on the ground of
defective matrimonial consent on account of natural incapacity by reason of any
factor causative of lack of sufficient use of reason, grave lack of due
discretion and inability to assume essential obligations – although the law
categorically mandates said intervention only in the case of impotence and
downright mental disorder.”
[6] TSN, 11
December 1997, pp. 3-10.
[7] Te
v. Yu-Te, supra note 4, p. 35, citing Kahn and
Fawcett, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
MENTAL HEALTH, 1993 ed., p. 131.
[8] Exhibit
C. RTC records, pp. 42-57.
[9] Id.,
p. 44.
[10] See RTC
Decision, rollo, p. 107.
[11] Exhibit
C, supra at 51.
[12] TSN, supra note
6, p. 7.
[13] Id.,
p. 8. Respondent was described as domineering, demanding and short-tempered.
[14] Exhibit
C, supra at 44.
[15] TSN, supra note
6, p. 7.
[16] Id., see pp.
9-10:
Q. Now, would you say that this psychological
incapacity which you identified and described earlier, is it beyond treatment?
A. Yes, sir.
xx xx xx
Q. Now, based on your findings and what you
said, would you say then that the psychological incapacity of the petitioner
was already apparent even before he got married?
A. Yes, sir.
[17] Te
v. Yu-Te, supra note 4, p. 34, citing Kahn
and Fawcett, THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MENTAL HEALTH, 1993 ed., p. 292.
[18] Id.,
p. 35, citing Bernstein, Penner, Clarke-Stewart and Roy, PSYCHOLOGY, 7th ed.,
2006, pp. 613-614.