Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
ERLINDA REYES and ROSEMARIE MATIENZO,
Petitioners,
- versus -
HON. JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ, Presiding, Branch 49, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Caloocan City; SPOUSES BERNARD and FLORENCIA PERL, represented
by Attorney-in-Fact BENJAMIN MUCIO; HON. JUDGE VICTORIA ISABEL A. PAREDES,
Presiding, Branch 124, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City and SEGUNDO
BAUTISTA,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
SPS. ALBERTO EMBORES and LOURDES EMBORES, SPS.
ROBERTO AND EVELYN PALAD, DENNIS HENOSA and CORAZON LAURENTE,
Petitioners,
- versus -
HON. RAYMUNDO G. VALLEGA, Presiding Judge, Branch
52, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City; HON. ELEANOR R. KWONG, Presiding
Judge, Branch 51, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City; HON. JUDGE BELEN
B. ORTIZ, Presiding Judge, Branch 49, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan
City; VICTORIA C. SALIRE-ALBIS, represented by her attorney-in-fact MR.
MENELIO C. SALIRE; MA. FE R. ROCO, ALFREDO TAN, MANUELITO ESTRELLA; and HON.
JUDGE ANTONIO FINEZA, Presiding Judge, Branch 131, Regional Trial Court,
Caloocan City,
Respondents.
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G.R. No. 137794
G.R. No. 149664
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,*
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 11,
2010
|
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- - -x
D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The instant cases are consolidated
Petitions[1] for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, and
Prohibition. The
petitioners in G.R. No. 137794 seek to declare null and void the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 23477, an ejectment case, before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Caloocan City, Branch 49, and Civil Case No. C-17725, a complaint for
Recovery of Possession and Ownership, filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Caloocan City, Branch 124;[2] while the petitioners in G.R. No. 149664
pray for the nullity of the following ejectment proceedings before the
different branches of the Caloocan City MeTC: (1) Civil Case No. 99-25011,
Branch 52; (2) Civil Case No. 22559 and Civil Case No. 18575, Branch 49 and its
appeal to the RTC, Branch 131; (3) Civil Case No. 00-25892, Branch 51; and (4)
Civil Case No. 00-25889, Branch 51.[3] G.R.
No. 149664 was considered closed and terminated by the Court’s Resolution dated
August 30, 2006.[4]
The parcels of land which are the
subject matter of these cases are part of the Tala Estate, situated between the
boundaries of Caloocan City and Quezon City and encompassing an area of
7,007.9515 hectares more or less.[5]
In G.R. No. 137794, respondents
Segundo Bautista and spouses Bernard and Florencia Perl sought the ouster from
the contested lots of Erlinda Reyes, spouses Rene and Rosemarie Matienzo and
Sergio Abejero, who are occupants of separate home lots in Camarin, Caloocan
City.
The first case was commenced on
December 11, 1996, by respondent Segundo Bautista, a registered owner of the
parcel of land occupied by spouses Rene and Rosemarie Matienzo. The case was a
complaint for Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership of Real Property (Recovery
case) against the latter spouses with the RTC Caloocan City, Branch 124.[6] This
was docketed as Civil Case No. C-17725.[7]
Shortly thereafter, a separate but
related action, was initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, represented
by the Director of Lands on December 27, 1996, before the Quezon City RTC,
Branch 85 (re-raffled to Branch 93).[8] This
was a complaint for Annulment of Title/Reversion (Annulment/Reversion case) against Biyaya
Corporation and the Register of Deeds of the Cities of Pasig, Caloocan, and
Quezon, the City of Manila, and the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority involving the Tala Estate. The
case, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-96-29810, sought to declare null and void
the transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Biyaya Corporation,
and all derivative titles emanating therefrom, and to declare the land in suit
to be reverted to it as part of the patrimonial property of the State, and the
same be awarded to the actual occupants. One of the intervenors therein is
Samahan ng Maliliit na Magkakapitbahay (SAMAKABA) of which petitioners Erlinda
Reyes and Rosemarie Matienzo are members.[9]
On May 28, 1997, the Quezon City RTC
in the Annulment/Reversion case issued a Preliminary Injunction (Injunction)
freezing all ejectment cases involving the Tala Estate pending in the MeTCs of
Quezon City and Caloocan City.[10]
Believing that the Injunction issued
by the Quezon City RTC can be beneficial to them in the Recovery case pending
before the Caloocan City RTC, on June 27, 1997, spouses Rene and Rosemarie
Matienzo filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the Recovery case.[11] On
December 8, 1997, the Caloocan City RTC, Branch 124 denied said motion.[12] Spouses
Matienzo moved for the reconsideration of the motion, but the same was denied
on May 14, 1998.[13] The
spouses received the order denying their motion for reconsideration on June 9,
1998.[14] Trial
on the merits started on December 2, 1998.[15]
The second case, an ejectment
complaint, was commenced by spouses Bernard and Florencia Perl on June 25,
1997, against Erlinda Reyes before the Caloocan City MeTC, Branch 49.[16] It
was docketed as Civil Case No. 23477. Shortly thereafter, on July 8, 1997,
spouses Perl filed the third case, an ejectment action against Sergio
Abejero. The case, which
was raffled off to Branch 49 of the Caloocan City MeTC, was docketed as Civil
Case No. 23519.[17] Subsequently,
these two ejectment cases were consolidated (Ejectment cases).[18] In
her Answer and during the preliminary conference, Erlinda Reyes moved for the
suspension of the proceedings and/or for the dismissal of these cases citing
the Injunction issued in Civil Case No. Q-96-29810.[19] In
its Order[20] dated January 22, 1999, the MeTC did not
entertain Reyes’s motion, instead, it required her to submit a position
paper. Erlinda Reyes
received the order on March 11, 1999.[21] On
April 16, 1999, the trial court issued a Decision ordering Erlinda to vacate
the contested property.[22]
The Recovery case and the Ejectment
cases converged when petitioners Rosemarie Matienzo and Erlinda Reyes, joined
on March 25, 1999 in filing directly with this Court the instant petition
denominated as “Declaratory Relief, Certiorari,
and Prohibition,” mainly assailing the denial of their respective motions for
suspension.[23] Petitioners
Matienzo and Reyes asked that the proceedings in the Ejectment cases and the
Recovery case be declared null and void for violating the Injunction order of
the Quezon City RTC. This
case is docketed as G.R. No. 137794.
During the pendency of G.R. No.
137794, certain events supervened when the Ejectment cases ran their course and
petitioner Reyes appealed the MeTC decision to the RTC. In the RTC, the Ejectment cases were
docketed as Civil Cases Nos. C-18904-05.[24] Apparently, respondent-spouses Perl moved
for the execution of the MeTC decision pending appeal, which the RTC granted as
the Writ of Execution was thereafter issued on October 20, 2000.[25] Petitioner
Erlinda Reyes and company, thus, filed with this Court a motion to suspend the
proceedings in the RTC. [26] On October 25, 2000, this Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order restraining the implementation of the said writ of
execution.[27]
G.R. No. 149664, on the other hand,
emanated from four distinct ejectment complaints filed against petitioners
Corazon Laurente, spouses Alberto and Lourdes Embores, spouses Roberto and
Evelyn Palad, and Dennis Henosa.[28] The
parcels of land from which petitioners were sought to be evicted were located
in Camarin, Caloocan City and within the Tala Estate.[29] Petitioners
were members of Alyansa Ng Mga Naninirahan Sa Tala Friar Lands (ALNATFRAL), an
intervenor in the Reversion case.[30] These
ejectment cases were all filed after the Injunction order was issued on May 28,
1997 by the Quezon City RTC in the Annulment/Reversion case. Thus, petitioners separately invoked
the said injunction in seeking the dismissal or suspension of the four
ejectment cases. Petitioners’
motions for suspension were dismissed and the trial court proceeded to render
judgments on these cases. Petitioners resorted directly to this Court in
seeking the declaration of nullity of the proceedings of these ejectment cases
for violating the prevailing injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC.
Meanwhile, on March 4, 2003, the
petitioners in G.R. No. 149664 filed a motion for consolidation asking that the
said case be consolidated with G.R. No. 137794.
On April 28, 2003, this Court resolved
to consolidate the two cases.
On July 28, 2006, petitioners in G.R.
No. 149664 filed a Motion to Withdraw and/or Dismiss Instant Petition[31] stating that since a decision in the
Annulment/Reversion case (Civil Case No. Q-96-29810) was already issued
(although they did not attach a copy thereof), the petition is therefore
rendered moot and academic as the injunction order was effective only pending
determination of the merits.
On August 30, 2006, the Court granted
the motion to withdraw petition in G.R. No. 149664 and considered the same
closed and terminated.[32] On
October 11, 2006, G.R. No. 149664 became final and executory.
What remains to be resolved,
therefore, are the issues raised in G.R. No. 137794.
In their bid to declare null and void
the proceedings in the Recovery case and the Ejectment cases, petitioners
argued that the Caloocan City MeTC, where the Ejectment cases were filed, and
the Caloocan City RTC where the Recovery case was pending, were divested of
jurisdiction since the Quezon City RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject
matter.[33] Petitioners
specifically alleged that the MeTC’s refusal to suspend the Ejectment cases
despite the Injunction order is tantamount or amounting to lack of or excess of
jurisdiction. As to the
Caloocan City RTC, its desistance to heed the Injunction is unjustified and
contrary to well-settled jurisprudence.[34] Petitioners
were of the view that the interference by the Quezon City RTC was justified
since no third-party claim is involved.[35]
The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) adopts the position of petitioners in praying that the orders denying the
motion to suspend proceedings and the proceedings that transpired in the
Ejectment cases be set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.[36] Citing Honda Giken Kogyo-Kabushiki Kaisha
v. San Diego,[37] where it was held that a writ of
injunction may be issued to a court by another court superior in rank, the OSG
maintains that the Injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC in Civil Case No.
Q-96-29810 covers all metropolitan trial courts including the Ejectment cases
in Caloocan City MeTC, Branch 49.[38] The
OSG also maintains that the Injunction was in accordance with the settled
jurisprudence where the reversion case is being filed by the State.
Respondent Segundo Bautista contends
that petitioners resorted to a wrong remedy. He argues that the action for
declaratory relief can only prosper if the statute, deed, or contract has not
been violated.[39] Hence,
where the law or contract has already been breached prior to the filing of the
declaratory relief, courts can no longer assume jurisdiction since this action
is not geared towards the settling of issues arising from breach or violation
of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, and
contract, but rather it is intended to secure an authoritative statement for
guidance in their enforcement or compliance of the same.[40] Since
the Injunction order of the Quezon City RTC had already been violated as early
as December 8, 1997 by the Caloocan City RTC in the Recovery case, or before
the filing of this instant petition, resort to Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
would not lie. Respondent
Bautista insists that the instant recourse of petitioner Matienzo was resorted
to as a ploy to substitute the filing of certiorari under Rule 65, which she already lost
since the 60-day period had already expired.[41] Respondent
points out that direct resort to this Court violates the rule on the hierarchy
of courts. Since it was the
Caloocan City RTC which denied petitioner Matienzo’s motion to suspend
proceedings, the petition for declaratory relief should have been filed with
the Court of Appeals. Direct
filing with this Court is not justified as, other than making motherhood
statements, petitioner Matienzo failed to state clearly the exceptional and
compelling circumstances to justify the exercise of this Court’s primary
jurisdiction.[42] He
likewise contends that the Caloocan City RTC did not err in not suspending the
proceedings in the Recovery case, notwithstanding the Injunction issued by the
Quezon City RTC, since the said injunction applied only to the MeTCs of Quezon
City and Caloocan City so the RTC was excluded from the injunction order. He avers that it is the Caloocan City
RTC which is vested with the jurisdiction to hear and decide the case until its
final conclusion since it had acquired the same ahead of the Quezon City
RTC. He states that being
co-equal, the Quezon City RTC had no authority to stop by injunction the
Caloocan City RTC and even though there are instances where another court may
exercise coordinate jurisdiction in cases where there are justifiable grounds,
here, petitioner Matienzo has not alleged any of those circumstances.
Petitioners insist that this is mainly
a petition for declaratory relief. Section
1, Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides:
SECTION
1. Who may file petition.
— Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach
or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court
to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
An
action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or
remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the
Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule.
The foregoing section can be dissected
into two parts. The first
paragraph concerns declaratory relief, which has been defined as a special
civil action by any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument or whose rights are affected by a statute, ordinance, executive
order or regulation to determine any question of construction or validity
arising under the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute and for
a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The second paragraph pertains to (1)
an action for the reformation of an instrument; (2) an action to quiet title;
and (3) an action to consolidate ownership in a sale with a right to
repurchase.[43]
The first paragraph of Section 1 of
Rule 63 enumerates the subject matter to be inquired upon in a declaratory
relief namely, deed, will, contract or other written instrument, a statute,
executive order or regulation, or any government regulation. This Court, in Lerum v. Cruz,[44] declared that the subject matters to be
tested in a petition for declaratory relief are exclusive, viz:
Under
this rule, only a person who is interested “under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute or
ordinance, may bring an action to determine any question of construction or
validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his
rights or duties thereunder.” This
means that the subject matter must refer to a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or to a statute or ordinance, to warrant declaratory
relief. Any other matter not mentioned therein is deemed excluded. This is
under the principle of expressio
unius est exclussio alterius. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing holding was reiterated in Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,[45] wherein this Court stressed that court
orders or decisions cannot be made the subject matter of a declaratory relief,
thus:
Judge
Querubin's query is not an action for declaratory relief. Section 1 of Rule 64
[now Rule 63] of the Rules of Court provides the requisites of an action for
declaratory relief. In interpreting these requisites, the Court has ruled that:
x x x x
The letter of Judge Querubin pertained to final orders and
decisions of the courts that are clearly not the proper subjects of a petition
for declaratory relief. Thus, the requisites prescribed by the Rules of Court in an
action for declaratory relief are not applicable to the letter of Judge
Querubin.[46] (Emphasis supplied.)
Then again in a recent ruling of this
Court, it was emphasized:
A petition
for declaratory relief cannot properly have a court decision as its subject
matter. In Tanda v. Aldaya [98 Phil. 244 (1956)], we ruled that:
[A] court
decision cannot be interpreted as included within the purview of the words
“other written instrument,” as contended by appellant, for the simple reason
that the Rules of Court already provide for the ways by which an ambiguous or
doubtful decision may be corrected or clarified without need of resorting to
the expedient prescribed by Rule 66 [now Rule 64].[47] (Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, petitioners Erlinda Reyes and Rosemarie
Matienzo assailed via Declaratory Relief under Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court, the orders of the trial courts denying their motions to
suspend proceedings. This
recourse by petitioners, unfortunately, cannot be countenanced since a court
order is not one of those subjects to be examined under Rule 63.
The proper remedy that petitioner
Erlinda Reyes could have utilized from the denial of her motion to suspend
proceedings in the Caloocan City MeTC was to file a motion for reconsideration
and, if it is denied, to file a petition for certiorari before the RTC pursuant to Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. On the
other hand, petitioner Matienzo should have filed a special civil action on certiorari also under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals from
the denial of her motion by the Caloocan City RTC. The necessity of filing the petition
to the RTC in the case of Erlinda Reyes and to the Court of Appeals in the case
of Matienzo is dictated by the principle of the hierarchy of courts.[48] Both
petitions must be filed within 60 days from the receipt or notice of the denial
of the motion to suspend proceedings or from the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. Section 4
of Rule 65 partly provides:
Sec. 4. When
and where to file the petition. - The petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case
a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion
is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
counted from the notice of the denial of said motion.
If the petition relates to an act or
an omission of a municipal trial court x x x, it shall be filed with the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or
with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court’s
appellate jurisdiction.
Despite this procedural remedy
available to them, petitioners, under the pretext that they were in a quandary
as to their rights under the Injunction order of the Quezon City RTC, directly
filed the instant case here. Petitioners did not bother to proffer a compelling
reason for their direct resort to this Court. This procedural faux pas proves fatal. The Court’s exhortation against taking
a procedural shortcut cannot be overemphasized. In Ortega
v. The Quezon City Government, [49] the Court accentuated:
At
all events, even if this petition delves on questions of law, there is no
statutory or jurisprudential basis for according to this Court original and
exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory relief which advances only questions of
law.
Finally,
while a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for prohibition
if it has far reaching implications and raises questions that need to be
resolved, there is no allegation of facts by petitioner tending to show that
she is entitled to such a writ. The
judicial policy must thus remain that this Court will not entertain direct
resort to it, except when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper
courts or when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant availment of a
remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Court's primary jurisdiction.
(Emphasis supplied.)
To make matters worse, petitioner
Matienzo obviously availed of the instant declaratory relief to substitute for
a petition for certiorari,
a remedy which she sadly lost by inaction. It must be recalled that on December
8, 1997, the Caloocan City RTC, Branch 124 denied Matienzo’s motion to suspend
proceedings.[50] She
moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied on May 14, 1998.[51] She
received the Order denying her motion for reconsideration on June 9, 1998.[52] She
had 60 days therefrom to question the same before the Quezon City RTC. It was only on March 25, 1999 that
petitioner Matienzo assailed the order denying her motion for reconsideration,
albeit wrongly before this Court.[53] From
this, it can be inferred that petitioner Matienzo’s recourse is a belated
attempt designed to salvage her lost opportunity to assail the order denying
her motion to suspend proceedings.
Also unavailing are the contentions of
petitioners that the Caloocan City RTC and MeTC committed grave abuse of
discretion when they denied petitioners’ motions to suspend proceedings. The pertinent portion of the
Injunction order of the Quezon City RTC reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this
Court has to grant, as it hereby grants the application for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction. Let a writ of preliminary Injunction be issued
ordering defendant representing Biyaya Corporation, its agents, assigns, and
transferees, as well as all other persons representing themselves as owners of
certain portions of the land in question, otherwise known as the Tala Estate,
to immediately cease and desist from doing or causing to do, further acts of
disposition of the lots subject of the present complaint, such as the filing of
ejectment cases in the
Municipal Trial Courts of Quezon City and Caloocan City and, the demolition and ejectment therefrom of the
members of the herein Intervenors. Accordingly,
the Metropolitan Trial Courts of Quezon City and Caloocan City are specifically ordered to cease and
desist from further conducting trials and proceedings in the ejectment cases
filed and to be filed involving the lots of the present complaint, until
further orders from this Court.[54] (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing order is not addressed to
the Caloocan City RTC. Neither can it be inferred from the language thereof
that the Quezon City RTC intended to enjoin the Caloocan City RTC from further
proceeding with the Recovery case. The
order merely mentions the Caloocan City MeTCs. Nothing more. But more importantly,
the Quezon City RTC could not have validly enjoined the Caloocan City RTC
without violating the doctrine that no court has the power to interfere by
injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate
jurisdiction.[55] Spouses
Ching v. Court of Appeals[56] justifies this rule in this manner:
Beginning
with the case of Orais v.
Escaño, down to the subsequent cases of Nuñez
v. Low, Cabigao v. del Rosario, Hubahib v. Insular Drug Co., Inc., National
Power Corp. v. De Veyra, Luciano
v. Provincial Governor, De
Leon v. Hon. Judge Salvador, Cojuangco v. Villegas, Darwin v. Tokonaga, we laid down the long standing doctrine that no
court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of
a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. The various trial courts
of a province or city, having the same or equal authority, should not, cannot,
and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with
their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion
and seriously hamper the administration of justice. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Compania
General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Court of Appeals,[57] two civil cases with identical causes of
action were filed in different RTCs, one ahead of the other. The second RTC which acquired
jurisdiction over the case issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the
proceedings in the RTC which first acquired jurisdiction of the case. Ruling against the injunction issued
by the RTC, this Court stressed:
Hence,
nothing can be clearer than that Judge Rapatalo had indeed issued the
questioned writ of preliminary injunction with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for the blatant disregard of the
basic precept that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the
judgments or orders of a co-equal and coordinate court of concurrent
jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by injunction.
This
Court explained in Parco vs.
Court of Appeals that:
x
x x Jurisdiction is vested in the court not in any particular branch or judge,
and as a corollary rule, the various branches of the Court of First Instance of
a judicial district are a coordinate and co-equal courts one branch stands on
the same level as the other. Undue interference by one on the proceedings and
processes of another is prohibited by law. In the language of this Court, the
various branches of the Court of First Instance of a province or city, having
as they have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent
and coordinate jurisdiction should not, cannot, and are not permitted to
interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments
x x x.
Needless
to say, adherence to a different rule would sow confusion and wreak havoc on
the orderly administration of justice, and in the ensuing melee, hapless
litigants will be at a loss as to where to appear and plead their cause.[58] (Emphasis supplied.)
While there are recognized exceptions to
the foregoing rule, other than citing said cases, [59] petitioners did not explain the
applicability of said exceptional cases to their petition.
Bereft of merit too is petitioners’
argument that the Caloocan City MeTC cannot disregard the injunction order of
the Quezon City RTC hearing the Annulment/Reversion case. The established rule is that a pending
civil action for ownership such as annulment of title shall not ipso facto suspend an ejectment proceeding.[60] The
Court explained that the rationale for this is that in an ejectment case, the
issue is possession, while in an annulment case the issue is ownership.[61] In
fact, an ejectment case can be tried apart from an annulment case.[62] Although
there is an exception to this rule, petitioners failed to justify that this
case falls within said exception. The words of the Court on this matter are
instructive:
In the absence of a concrete showing of compelling
equitable reasons at least
comparable and under circumstances analogous to Amagan, we cannot override the established rule that a pending
civil action for ownership shall not ipso
facto suspend an ejectment
proceeding. Additionally, to
allow a suspension on the basis of the reasons the petitioners presented in
this case would create the dangerous precedent of allowing an ejectment suit to
be suspended by an action filed in another court by parties who are not
involved or affected by the ejectment suit.[63] (Emphases supplied.)
Hence, petitioners’ posture that the
Ejectment cases should be suspended due to the pendency of the
Annulment/Reversion case is not meritorious.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order dated
October 25, 2000 issued by this Court is LIFTED.
SO
ORDERED.