Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
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SOCORRO LIMOS, ROSA DELOS REYES
and SPOUSES ROLANDO DELOS REYES and EUGENE DELOS REYES
Petitioners,
- versus -
SPOUSES FRANCISCO P. ODONES and
ARWENIA R. ODONES,
Respondents.
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G.R. No. 186979
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 11, 2010
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the August 14, 2008 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A. GR. SP No.
97668 and its Resolution[2] dated March 9, 2009 denying petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration.
The impugned Decision affirmed the resolution dated November 16,
2006[3] and Order dated January 5, 2007[4] of the trial court, which respectively denied
petitioners’ Motion to Set for Preliminary Hearing the Special and Affirmative
Defenses[5] and motion for reconsideration.[6]
The antecedents:
On June 17, 2005, private respondents-spouses
Francisco Odones and Arwenia Odones, filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed,
Title and Damages against petitioners Socorro Limos, Rosa Delos Reyes and
Spouses Rolando Delos Reyes and Eugene Delos Reyes, docketed as Civil Case No.
05-33 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68.
The complaint alleged that spouses Odones are
the owners of a 940- square meter parcel of land located at Pao 1st,
Camiling, Tarlac by virtue of an Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale
dated, January 29, 2004, executed by the surviving grandchildren and heirs of
Donata Lardizabal in whom the original title to the land was registered. These
heirs were Soledad Razalan Lagasca, Ceferina Razalan Cativo, Rogelio Lagasca
Razalan and Dominador Razalan.
It took a while before respondents decided to
register the document of conveyance; and when they did, they found out that the
land’s Original Certificate of Title (OCT) was cancelled on April 27, 2005 and
replaced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 329427 in the name of
herein petitioners.
Petitioners were able to secure TCT No. 329427 by virtue of a Deed
of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Donata Lardizabal and her husband
Francisco Razalan on April 18, 1972.
Petitioners then subdivided the lot among themselves and had TCT
No. 329427 cancelled. In lieu thereof, three new TCTs were issued: TCT No.
392428 in the names of Socorro Limos and spouses Rolando Delos Reyes and Eugene
Delos Reyes, TCT No. 392429 in the names of Spouses delos Reyes and TCT No.
392430 in the name of Rosa Delos Reyes.
Respondents sought the cancellation of these new TCTs on the
ground that the signatures of Donata Lardizabal and Francisco Razalan in the
1972 Deed of Absolute Sale were forgeries, because they died on June 30, 1926
and June 5, 1971, respectively.[7]
In response, petitioners filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars[8] claiming ambiguity in respondents’ claim that
their vendors are the only heirs of Donata Lardizabal. Finding no merit in the
motion, the trial court denied the same and ordered petitioners to file their
answer to the complaint.[9]
In their answer,[10] petitioners pleaded affirmative defenses, which
also constitute grounds for dismissal of the complaint. These grounds were: (1)
failure to state a cause of action inasmuch as the basis of respondents’ alleged
title is void, since the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale was not
published and it contained formal defects, the vendors are not the legal heirs
of Donata Lardizabal, and respondents are not the real parties-in-interest to
question the title of petitioners, because no transaction ever occurred between
them; (2) non-joinder of the other heirs of Donata Lardizabal as indispensable
parties; and (3) respondents’ claim is barred by laches.
In their Reply, respondents denied the foregoing affirmative
defenses, and insisted that the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale was
valid. They maintained their standing as owners of the subject parcel of land
and the nullity of the 1972 Absolute Deed of Sale, upon which respondents
anchor their purported title.[11] They appended the sworn statement of Amadeo
Razalan declaring, among other things that:
(2) Na hindi ko minana at ibinenta ang
nasabing lupa kay Socorro Limos at Rosa delos Reyes at hindi totoo na ako lang
ang tagapagmana ni Donata Lardizabal;
x x x x
(4) Ang aming
lola na si Donata Lardizabal ay may tatlong (3) anak na patay na sina Tomas
Razalan, Clemente Razalan at Tomasa Razalan;
(5) Ang mga
buhay na anak ni Tomas Razalan ay sina; 1. Soledad Razalan; 2. Ceferina
Razalan; 3. Dominador Razalan; at 4. Amadeo Razalan. Ang mga buhay na anak ni
Clemente Razalan ay sina 1. Rogelio Lagasca (isang abnormal). Ang mga buhay na
anak ni Tomasa Razalan ay sina 1. Sotera Razalan at 2 pang kapatid;
x x x x[12]
Thereafter, petitioners served upon respondents a Request for
Admission of the following matters:
1. That the husband of the deceased Donata
Lardizabal is Francisco Razalan;
2. That the children of the deceased Sps. Donata
Lardizabal and Francisco Razalan are Mercedes Razalan, Tomasa Razalan and Tomas
Razalan;
3. That this Tomasa Razalan died on April 27, 1997,
if not when? [A]nd her heirs are (a) Melecio Partido surviving husband, and her
surviving children are (b) Eduardo Partido married to Elisa Filiana, (c)
Enrique Razalan Partido married to Lorlita Loriana, (d) Eduardo Razalan
Partido, (e) Sotera Razalan Partido married to James Dil-is and (f) Raymundo
Razalan Partido married to Nemesia Aczuara, and all residents of Camiling,
Tarlac.
4. That Amadeo Razalan is claiming also to be a grandchild
and also claiming to be sole forced heir of Donata Lardizabal pursuant to the
Succession by a Sole Heir with Sale dated January 24, 2000, executed before
Atty. Rodolfo V. Robinos.
5. That Amadeo Razalan is not among those who
signed the Extra[j]udicial Succession of Estate and Sale dated January 29, 2004
allegedly executed in favor of the plaintiffs, Sps. Francisco/Arwenia Odones;
6. That as per Sinumpaang Salaysay of Amadeo
Razalan which was submitted by the plaintiffs, the children of Tomasa Razalan
are Sotera Razalan and 2 brothers/sisters. These children of Tomasa Razalan did
not also sign the Extra[j]udicial Succession of Estate and Sale;
7. That there is/are no heirs of Clemente Razalan
who appeared to have executed the Extra[j]udicial Succession of Estate and
Sale;
8. That Soledad Razalan Lagasca, Ceferina Razalan
Cativo, Rogelio Lagasca Razalan and Dominador Razalan did not file any letters
(sic) of administration nor declaration of heirship before executing the
alleged Extra[j]udicial Succession of Estate and Sale in favor of plaintiffs.[13]
Respondents failed to respond to the Request for Admission, prompting
petitioners to file a Motion to Set for Preliminary Hearing on the Special and
Affirmative Defenses,[14] arguing that respondents’ failure to respond or object
to the Request for Admission amounted to an implied admission pursuant to
Section 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. As such, a hearing on the
affirmative defenses had become imperative because petitioners were no longer
required to present evidence on the admitted facts.
Respondents filed a comment on the Motion, contending that the
facts sought to be admitted by petitioners were not material and relevant to
the issue of the case as required by Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. Respondents
emphasized that the only attendant issue was whether the 1972 Deed of Absolute
Sale upon which petitioners base their TCTs is valid.[15]
In its Resolution dated November 16, 2006, the
RTC denied the Motion and held that item nos.
1 to 4 in the Request for Admission were earlier pleaded as affirmative
defenses in petitioners’ Answer, to which respondents already replied on July
17, 2006. Hence, it would be redundant for respondents to make another denial.
The trial court further observed that item nos. 5, 6, and 7 in the Request for
Admission were already effectively denied by the Extrajudicial Succession of
Estate and Sale appended to the complaint and by the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Amadeo Razalan attached to respondents’
Reply.[16] Petitioners moved for reconsideration[17] but the same was denied in an Order dated
January 5, 2007.[18]
Petitioners elevated this incident to the CA by
way of a special civil action for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC in issuing the impugned resolution and order.
On August 14, 2008, the CA dismissed the
petition ruling that the affirmative defenses raised by petitioners were not
indubitable, and could be best proven in a full-blown hearing.[19]
Their motion for reconsideration[20] having been denied,[21] petitioners are now
before this Court seeking a review of the CA’s pronouncements.
In essence, petitioners contend that the
affirmative defenses raised in their Motion are indubitable, as they were
impliedly admitted by respondents when they failed to respond to the Request
for Admission. As such, a preliminary hearing on the said affirmative defenses
must be conducted pursuant to our ruling in Gochan v. Gochan.[22]
We deny the petition.
Pertinent to the present controversy are the
rules on modes of discovery set forth in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 26 of the
Rules of Court, viz:
Section
1. Request for admission. – At any time
after issues have been joined, a party may file and serve upon any other party
a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any
material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the request or
of the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the
request. Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the request unless
copies have already been furnished.
SEC. 2 Implied
admission. – Each of the matters of which an admission is
requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the
request, which shall be not less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof,
or within such further time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom
the request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the
admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters for which
an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot
truthfully either admit or deny those matters.
x x x
x
Under these rules, a party who fails to respond
to a Request for Admission shall be deemed to have impliedly admitted all the
matters contained therein. It must be emphasized, however, that the application of the rules on modes of
discovery rests upon the sound discretion of the court.
As such, it is the duty of the courts to examine thoroughly
the circumstances of each case and to determine the applicability of the modes
of discovery, bearing always in mind the aim to attain an expeditious
administration of justice.[23]
The determination of the sanction to be imposed upon a party who
fails to comply with the modes of discovery also rests on sound judicial
discretion.[24] Corollarily, this discretion carries with it the determination of
whether or not to impose the sanctions attributable to such fault.
As correctly observed by the trial court, the matters set forth in
petitioners’ Request for Admission were the same affirmative defenses pleaded
in their Answer which respondents already traversed in their Reply. The said
defenses were likewise sufficiently controverted in the complaint and its
annexes. In effect, petitioners sought to compel respondents to deny once again
the very matters they had already denied, a redundancy, which if abetted, will
serve no purpose but to delay the proceedings and thus defeat the purpose of
the rule on admission as a mode of discovery which is “to expedite trial and relieve parties of the
costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of
which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.”[25]
A request for admission is not intended to
merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting party’s
pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact described in the request, whose
purpose is to establish said party’s cause of action or defense.
Unless it serves that purpose, it is pointless, useless, and a mere redundancy.[26]
Verily then, if the trial court finds that the
matters in a Request for Admission were already admitted or denied in previous
pleadings by the requested party, the latter cannot be compelled to admit or
deny them anew. In turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a
response to the request and thereafter, assume or even demand the application
of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26.
In this case, the redundant and unnecessarily vexatious nature of
petitioners’ Request for Admission rendered it ineffectual, futile, and
irrelevant so as to proscribe the operation of the implied admission rule in
Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. There being no implied admission
attributable to respondents’ failure to respond, the argument that a
preliminary hearing is imperative loses its point.
Moreover, jurisprudence[27] has always been firm and
constant in declaring that when the affirmative defense raised is failure to
state a cause of action, a preliminary hearing thereon is unnecessary,
erroneous, and improvident.
In any event, a perusal of respondents’ complaint shows that it
was sufficiently clothed with a cause of action and they were suited to file
the same.
In an action for annulment of title, the
complaint must contain the following allegations: (1) that the contested land
was privately owned by the plaintiff prior to the issuance of the assailed
certificate of title to the defendant; and (2) that the defendantperpetuated
a fraud or committed a mistake
in obtaining a document of title over the parcel of land claimed by the
plaintiff.[28]
Such action goes into the issue of ownership of the land covered
by a Torrens title, hence, the relief generally prayed for by the plaintiff is
to be declared as the land’s true owner.[29] Thus, the real
party-in-interest is the person claiming title or ownership adverse to that of
the registered owner.[30]
The herein complaint alleged: (1) that
respondents are the owners and occupants of a parcel of land located at Pao 1st Camiling, Tarlac, covered by OCT No. 11560 in
the name of Donata Lardizabal by virtue of an Extrajudicial Succession of
Estate and Sale; and (2) that petitioners fraudulently caused the cancellation
of OCT No. 11560 and the issuance of new TCTs in their names by presenting a
Deed of Absolute Sale with the forged signatures of Donata Lardizabal and her
husband, Francisco Razalan.
The absence of any transaction between
petitioners and respondents over the land is of no moment, as the thrust of the
controversy is the respondents’ adverse claims of rightful title and ownership
over the same property, which arose precisely because of the conflicting
sources of their respective claims.
As to the validity of the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate
and Sale and the status of petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest as the
only heirs of Donata Lardizabal, these issues go into the merits of the
parties’ respective claims and defenses that can be best determined on the
basis of preponderance of the evidence they will adduce in a full-blown trial.
A preliminary hearing, the objective of which is for the court to determine
whether or not the case should proceed to trial, will not sufficiently address
such issues.
Anent the alleged non-joinder of indispensable parties, it is
settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as
are just. It is only when the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable
party despite the order of the court, that the latter may dismiss the
complaint.[31] In this case, no
such order was issued by the trial court.
Equally settled is the fact that laches is
evidentiary in nature and it may not be established by mere allegations in the
pleadings and can not be resolved in a motion to dismiss.[32]
Finally, we cannot subscribe to petitioners’
contention that the status of the heirs of Donata Lardizabal who sold the
property to the respondents must first be established in a special proceeding.
The pronouncements in Heirs of Yaptinchay v.
Hon. Del Rosario[33] and in Reyes v. Enriquez[34] that the petitioners invoke do not find
application in the present controversy.
In both cases, this Court held that the declaration of heirship
can be made only in a special proceeding and not in a civil action. It must be noted that in Yaptinchay and Enriquez, plaintiffs’ action for
annulment of title was anchored on their alleged status as heirs of the
original owner whereas in this case, the respondents’ claim is rooted on a sale
transaction. Respondents herein are enforcing their rights as buyers in good
faith and for value of the subject land and not as heirs of the original owner.
Unlike in Yaptinchay and Enriquez, the filiation of
herein respondents to the
original owner is not determinative of their right to claim title to and
ownership of the property.
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
August 14, 2008 and its Resolution dated March 9, 2009 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
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DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
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ROBERTO
A. ABAD
Associate
Justice
|
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice