NATIONAL HOME
MORTGAGE FINANCE CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
- versus -
MARIO ABAYARI, MAY ALMINE, MA. VICTORIA ALPAJARO,
FLORANTE AMORES, ANGELINA ANCHETA, ANGELINE ODIEM-ARANETA, CECILIA PACIBLE,
MIRIAM BAJADO, EDUARDO BALAURO, EVANGELINA BALIAO, LUISA BANUA, RIZALINA
BENLAYO, MARJORIE BINAG, CRESENCIA BISNAR, CARMELITA BREBONERIA, JOSELYN
BUNYI, EMILIO CABAMONGAN, JR., PAZ DIVINA CABANERO, RAUL CABANILLA, LEONILA
WYNDA CADA, CELSTINA CASAO, ELIZABETH CASAS, ARNULFO CATALAN, FRANCIS DE LA
CHICA, JAIME CORTES, JAIME DE LA CRUZ, JHONNY CUSTODIO, MA. BELINDA DAPULA,
REMEDIOS DEBUQUE, REBECCA DECARA, JOCELYN DIEGO, JAIME DUQUE, LUCIA ENRIQUEZ,
MA. LUCIA ESPEROS, HELEN EVANGELISTA, CELSO FERNANDEZ, EDILBERTO SAN GABRIEL,
REYNALDO SAN GABRIEL, EDMUNDO GARAIS, JENNILYN GOZADO, EVELYN GUEVARRA, MA.
MAGDALENA HIDONA, VICTORINO INDEFONSO, JR., GRACE CECILLE JAVIER, MARIETA
JOSE, MA. CECILIA KAPAW-AN, EVANGELINE LABAY, SENORA LUCUNSAY, MILAGROSO
ALLAN LAMBAN, VIOLETA DE LEON, CHARITO LONTAYAO, REMEDIOS LOYOLA, NORA
MALALUAN, ALBERTO MALIFICIADO, DENNIS MANZANO, MA. CONCEPCION MARQUEZ,
REYNALDO MASILANG, MAGDALENA MENDOZA, MELCHOR NANUD, MILAGROS NEPOMUCENO,
ROSEMARIE NEPOMUCENO, APOLO NISPEROS, ANNALIZA NOBRERA, EVANGELINE NUESCA,
YUMINA PABLO, GLORIA PANGANIBAN, ROGELIO PAQUIZ, ROLANDO PAREDES, NORA
PEDROSO, MARIA HILNA DELA PEÑA VICTORIA, PEÑARADA, MELVIN PERALTA, DOROTHY PEREZ,
FREDERICK MICHAEL PORTACION, ROMMEL RABACA, RODERICK REALUBIT, GWENDOLYN
REMORIN, ANTONIO DE LOS REYES, NERISSA REYES, NENITA ROBRIGADO, ALLAN ROMERO,
MA. ROSARIO ROMULO, LUIS DEL ROSARIO, CRISTINA ROSAS, DEXTER SALAZAR,
MAGDALENA SALOMON, OLIVIA SALOMON, ELENITA SANCHEZ, ANGELINA SANTELICES,
ANABELLE SANTOS, SHARLENE SANTOS, JAIME SINGH DELMASINGUN, EVELYN SO,
MILAGROS SOLMIRANO, CHRISTINE TALUSIK, CYRIL ROMUADO TEJA EFREN TESORERO,
PENNYLANE TIONGSON, CYPRIANO TOMINES, RONILO UMALI, MA. LOURSES VALDUAZA, MA.
ANTONIA VALENZUELA, EDWIN VANGUARDIA, CARLO VEGA, ANNAMOR VELASCO, ESTEFANIA
VILLANUEVA, CANDELARIA YODICO,
Respondents.
|
G.R.
No. 166508
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 2, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
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In this petition for review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation assails the August 20, 2004 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82637, which
dismissed its petition forcertiorari from
the October 14, 2003[3] and December 15, 2003[4] Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, Branch 138.[5] The
said Orders, in turn, respectively granted the issuance of a writ of execution
and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in Civil Case No. 99-1209 –
a case for mandamus.
The antecedents follow.
Petitioner, the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC), is a government-owned and controlled corporation created
under the authority of Presidential Decree No. 1267 for the primary purpose of developing and providing a secondary
market for home mortgages granted by public and/or private home-financing
institutions. [6] In its employ were respondents,[7] mostly rank-and-file employees, who all profess as
having been hired after June 30, 1989.[8]
On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise
known as The Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989, was
enacted and was subsequently approved on August 21, 1989. Section 12 thereof directed that all
allowances – namely representation and transportation allowance, clothing
and laundry allowance, subsistence allowance, hazard pay and other allowances
as may be determined by the budget department – enjoyed by covered employees
should be deemed included in the standardized salary rates prescribed therein,
and that the other additional compensation being received by incumbents only as
of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates should
continue to be authorized. To
implement the law, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued
Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10.[9] Section
5.5[10] thereof excluded certain allowances and benefits from
integration into the standardized basic salary but continued their grant to
those who were incumbents as of June 30, 1989 and who were actually receiving
the benefits as of said date. These
are the allowances involved in this case.
Respondents filed a petition for mandamus with the RTC of Makati City, Branch
138[11] to compel petitioner to pay them meal, rice, medical,
dental, optical and children’s allowances, as well as longevity pay, which
allegedly were already being enjoyed by other NHMFC employees as early as July
1, 1989. In its April 27,
2001 Decision, the trial court ruled favorably and ordered petitioner to pay
respondents the allowances prayed for, retroactive to the respective dates of
appointment.[12] The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the petitioners and respondent is ordered to pay
petitioners their meal allowance, rice allowance, medical allowance, longevity
pay and children’s allowance retroactive to the dates of their respective
appointments up to the present or for the time that they were employed by the
respondent.
SO ORDERED.[13]
In arriving at the conclusion that respondents
were entitled to the prayed-for benefits, the trial court explained, thus,
The use of the word
“only” before the words July 1, 1989 in section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758
appears to be the source of the dispute.
Section 12 is clear that
other additional compensation being received by incumbents only as of July 1,
1989 that are not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue
to be authorized. The law is prospective in effect and it does not say that
such additional compensation shall not continue to be authorized for employees
appointed after June 30, 1989. The
use of the word “only” before the words “as of July 1, 1989” qualifies the
additional compensation which can be continued. The foregoing applies to all employees
whether permanent or casual.
DBM Circular No. 10, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations particularly section 5.5 thereof…use the
word “only” for incumbents as of June 30, 1989 and by implication the same
shall not apply to employees appointed after June 30, 1989. This is in effect another
qualification limiting the grant of benefits to those who are incumbents as of
June 30, 1989, a condition not imposed by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758
for which reason it has to be strike (sic) down.[14]
Petitioner timely filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals.[15] In
its November 21, 2001 Decision, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s
ruling.[16] No
appeal was taken from the decision and upon its finality,[17] respondents moved for execution.[18]
However, the motion for execution was withdrawn when
on May 12, 2002, petitioner and respondents executed a Compromise Agreement in
which petitioner bound itself to comply with the decision rendered in the case,
except that the payment of the allowances adjudicated in favor of respondents
would be made in four installments instead. It was, likewise stipulated therein
that the parties waive all claims against each other. The trial court did not take any
positive action on the compromise except to note the same since the parties did
not intend to novate the April 27, 2001 Decision.[19] On
that basis, petitioner had started paying respondents the arrears in benefits.
Conflict arose when the DBM sent a letter[20] dated July 15, 2003 to NHMFC President Angelico Salud
disallowing the payment of certain allowances, including those awarded by the
trial court to respondents. A
reading of the letter reveals that the disallowance was made in accordance with
the 2002 NHMFC Corporate Operating Budget previously issued by the DBM.
To abide by the DBM’s directive, petitioner then
issued a memorandum stating that effective August 2003, the grant of benefits
to its covered employees, including those awarded to respondents, would be curtailed pursuant to the DBM letter.[21] This
eventuality compelled respondents to file for the second time a motion for a
writ of execution of the trial court’s April 27, 2001 decision. [22]
In its October 14, 2003 Order,[23] the trial court found merit in respondents’ motion;
hence, it directed the execution of the judgment. Petitioner moved for reconsideration[24] but it was denied.[25] On
February 16, 2004, the trial court issued a Writ of Execution/Garnishment with
a directive to the sheriff to tender to respondents the amount of their
collective claim equivalent to P4,806,530.00
to be satisfied out of petitioners goods and chattels and if the same be not
sufficient, out of its existing real property.[26] Respondents
then sought the garnishment of its funds under the custody of the Land Bank of
the Philippines.[27]
Bent on preventing execution, petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 82637.[28] In
it, petitioner ascribed grave abuse of discretion to the trial court in
ordering the execution of the judgment. It
pointed out that the trial court disregarded the fact that the DBM’s issuance
amounted to a supervening event, or an occurrence that changed the situation of
the parties that would make the continued payment of allowances to respondents
impossible and illegal, and disregarded the DBM’s exclusive authority to allow
or disallow the payment of the benefits in question.[29] It
likewise faulted the trial court in ordering the garnishment of its funds
despite the settled rule that government funds may not be garnished in the
absence of an appropriation made by law.[30]
The Court of Appeals, however, found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court; hence, in its August 20, 2004
Decision, it dismissed the petition for lack of merit.[31]
In its present recourse, petitioner, on the one hand,
insists that it is difficult not to consider the issuance of the DBM in this
case as a supervening event that would make the execution of the trial court’s
decision inequitable and/or impossible, since the determination of entitlement
to benefits and allowances among government employees is within the agency’s
exclusive authority. It
argues that, hence, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were in error
to order the execution of the decision as the same totally disregards the rule
that issuances of administrative agencies are valid and enforceable.[32] Again,
it asserts that the garnishment of its funds was not in order as there was no
existing appropriation therefor.[33]
Respondents, on the other hand, argue in the main that
inasmuch as the core issue of whether they were entitled to the schedule of
benefits under Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758 had already been settled by both the
trial court in Civil Case No. 99-1209 and the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
66303, the DBM letter should not be allowed to interfere with the decision and
render the same ineffective. Since
the said decision had already attained finality, they posit that execution
appeared to be the only just and equitable measure under the premises[34] and that garnishment lies against petitioner’s funds
inasmuch as it has a personality separate and distinct from the government.[35]
There is partial merit in the petition.
To begin with, a writ of mandamus is a command issuing from a court of
law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or sovereign, directed
to an inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person,
requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty
results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed, or
from operation of law.[36] It is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty[37]which, as opposed to a discretionary one, is that
which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of his or its own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done.[38]
A favorable judgment rendered in a special civil
action for mandamus is in the nature of a special
judgment. As such, it
requires the performance of any other act than the payment of money or the sale
or delivery of real or personal property the execution of which is governed by
Section 11, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court[39] which states:
SECTION 11. Execution of Special Judgment.—When
the judgment requires the performance of any act other than those mentioned in
the two preceding sections, a certified copy of the judgment shall be attached
to the writ of execution and shall be served by the officer upon the party
against whom the same is rendered, or upon any other person required thereby,
or by law, to obey the same, and such party or person may be punished for
contempt if he disobeys such judgment.
While the April 17, 2001 Decision of
the trial court ordered petitioner to pay the benefits claimed by respondents,
it by no means ordered the payment of a specific sum of money and instead
merely directed petitioner to extend to respondents the benefits under R.A. No.
6758 and its implementing rules. Being
a special judgment, the decision may not be executed in the same way as a
judgment for money handed down in an ordinary civil case governed by Section 9,
Rule 39 of the Rules Court which sanctions garnishment of debts and credits to
satisfy a monetary award. Garnishment is proper only when the judgment to be
enforced is one for payment of a sum of money. It cannot be employed to implement a
special judgment such as that rendered in a special civil action for mandamus.[40]
On this score, not only did the trial
court exceed the scope of its judgment when it awarded the benefits claimed by
respondents. It also
committed a blatant error when it issued the February 16, 2004 Order directing
the garnishment of petitioner’s funds with the Land Bank of the Philippines equivalent
to P4,806,530.00, even
though the said amount was not specified in the decision it sought to
implement.
Be that as it may, assuming for the
sake of argument that execution by garnishment could proceed in this case
against the funds of petitioner, it must bear stress that the latter is a
government-owned or controlled corporation with a charter of its own. Its juridical personality is separate
and distinct from the government and it can sue and be sued in its name.[41] As
such, while indeed it cannot evade the effects of the execution of an adverse
judgment and may not ordinarily place its funds beyond an order of garnishment
issued in ordinary cases,[42] it is imperative in order for execution to ensue that
a claim for the payment of the judgment award be first filed with the
Commission on Audit (COA).[43]
Under Commonwealth Act
No. 327,[44] as amended by P.D. No. 1445,[45] the COA, as
one of the three independent constitutional commissions, is specifically vested
with the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts
pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds
and property owned or held in trust by the government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned and
controlled corporations.[46] To ensure the effective discharge of its
functions, it is vested with ample powers, subject to constitutional
limitations, to define the scope of its audit and examination and establish the
techniques and methods required therefor, to promulgate accounting and auditing
rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures
or uses of government funds and properties.[47] Section 1,[48] Rule II of the COA Rules of Procedure materially
provides:
Section 1. General Jurisdiction.—The
Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and duty to examine, audit
and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or
pertaining to the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, including government owned and controlled corporations with
original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies,
commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under the
Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d)
such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity directly or
indirectly, from or through the government, which are required by law or the
granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or
equity. However, where the
internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission
may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are
necessary or appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of
the Government, and for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the
vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
x x x x
Specifically, such
jurisdiction shall extend over but not limited to the following: x x x Money
claims due from or owing to any government agency x x x.[49]
Clearly, the matter of
allowing or disallowing a money claim against petitioner is within the primary
power of the COA to decide. This
no doubt includes money claims arising from the implementation of R.A. No.
6758.[50] Respondents’ claim against petitioner, although it has
already been validated by the trial court’s final decision, likewise belongs to
that class of claims; hence, it must first be filed with the COA before
execution could proceed. And
from the decision therein, the aggrieved party is afforded a remedy by
elevating the matter to this Court via a petition for certiorari[51] in accordance with Section 1 Rule XI, of the COA Rules
of Procedure. It states:
Section 1. Petition for Certiorari. - Any decision, order or resolution of
the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
(30) days from receipt of a copy thereof in the manner provided by law, the
Rules of Court and these Rules.
When the decision, order
or resolution adversely affects the interest of any government agency, the
appeal may be taken by the proper head of the agency.
At this juncture, it is unmistakable that the recourse
of respondents in CA-G.R. SP No. 82637 as well as in the petition before us is
at best premature. Thus,
the Court cannot possibly rule on the merits of the petition lest we would only
be preempting the action of the COA on the matter. Suffice it to say that the propriety
or regularity of respondents’ claim under the judgment of the trial court may
properly be addressed by the COA in an appropriate action. And even if we endeavor to take great
lengths in deciding the merits of the case and determine the propriety of the
DBM’s issuance, its sufficiency to prevent the execution of the final judgment
rendered in this case, and the entitlement or non-entitlement of each one of
the respondents to the benefits under R.A. No. 6758, the same would
nevertheless be a futile exercise. This,
because after having pored over the records of the case, we found nothing
sufficient to support respondents’ uniform claim that they were incumbents as
of July 1, 1989 – the date
provided in Section 12 of R.A. 6758 – except perhaps
their bare contention that they
were all hired after June 30, 1989.
With this disquisition, we find no compelling reason
to unnecessarily lengthen the discussion by undeservingly proceeding further
with the other issues propounded by the parties.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED IN
PART. The Writ of
Execution dated February 16, 2004 issued in Civil Case No. 99-1209 is hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 138 is DIRECTED to issue a writ of execution in
accordance with this Decision and execute the judgment pursuant to Section 11,
Rule 39, of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice