G.R. No. L-7529 November 19, 1912
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.VALERIANO MOLINA, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
The appellant in this case was convicted of the crime of vagrancy as defined and penalized in Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission, and was sentenced to imprisonment for two months and the payment of the costs of the trial. The evidence of record discloses that the defendant was discharged from Bilibid Prison some time during the month of March, 1910, after serving a short sentence for a violation of the Opium Law; that from that time until the date of his prosecution on this charge of vagrancy, he had been engaged in no legal occupation, and was without any apparent means of support other than that supplied him by his mother; that he is an able-bodied man of 33 years of age; that he habitually neglected to apply himself to any lawful calling, and that he spent his time in loitering about the streets and frequenting cockpits and places where games of various kinds were conducted and where gambling was carried on; that he had been once convicted of a violation of the provisions of the Opium Law, and that he had been twice convicted on a charge of playing monte (a prohibited gambling game) toward the latter part of the year 1910. The accused, on his own behalf, testified that he was supported by his other, with whom he lived, and that he worked on her property. The evidence in this connection is not very satisfactory, but it seems clear that his mother is a woman of very small means, and that if she has any property at all, it is so small as to be wholly inadequate to furnish even a pretense of work for an able- bodied man. The accused, in explaining where he got the money to be at the cockpits, claimed that on various occasions his mother gave him small sums for that purpose, and that when he won he brought her the proceeds. These statements of the accused merely serve to confirm us in our opinion that the defendant was an idle, shiftless and worthless man who made no attempt to follow any legal calling, and whose habits of life were those of an immoral and dissolute good for nothing. In the case of Gavin vs. The State (96 Miss., 377), the court said that:
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court did not find that the claim by this able-bodied man, 33 years of age, that he was living on the charity of his mother, can be said to rebut the other evidence in the record which tended to disclose that he had no apparent means of support. He had no legal or moral claim upon his mother for support, and indeed, from the indications in the record as to the scanty means possessed by the mother, it would appear that it was his final duty to aid her rather than to call upon her for aid.
The judgment of conviction and the sentenced imposed by the trial court was affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.VALERIANO MOLINA, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
The appellant in this case was convicted of the crime of vagrancy as defined and penalized in Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission, and was sentenced to imprisonment for two months and the payment of the costs of the trial. The evidence of record discloses that the defendant was discharged from Bilibid Prison some time during the month of March, 1910, after serving a short sentence for a violation of the Opium Law; that from that time until the date of his prosecution on this charge of vagrancy, he had been engaged in no legal occupation, and was without any apparent means of support other than that supplied him by his mother; that he is an able-bodied man of 33 years of age; that he habitually neglected to apply himself to any lawful calling, and that he spent his time in loitering about the streets and frequenting cockpits and places where games of various kinds were conducted and where gambling was carried on; that he had been once convicted of a violation of the provisions of the Opium Law, and that he had been twice convicted on a charge of playing monte (a prohibited gambling game) toward the latter part of the year 1910. The accused, on his own behalf, testified that he was supported by his other, with whom he lived, and that he worked on her property. The evidence in this connection is not very satisfactory, but it seems clear that his mother is a woman of very small means, and that if she has any property at all, it is so small as to be wholly inadequate to furnish even a pretense of work for an able- bodied man. The accused, in explaining where he got the money to be at the cockpits, claimed that on various occasions his mother gave him small sums for that purpose, and that when he won he brought her the proceeds. These statements of the accused merely serve to confirm us in our opinion that the defendant was an idle, shiftless and worthless man who made no attempt to follow any legal calling, and whose habits of life were those of an immoral and dissolute good for nothing. In the case of Gavin vs. The State (96 Miss., 377), the court said that:
In
vagrancy, the offense consists in general worthlessness; that is to
say, in being idle, and though able to work, refusing to do so, and
living without labor, or on the charity of others.
This
definition of the offense substantially corresponds with the definition
of that class of vagrancy set forth in the first part of section 1 of
the Philippine Vagrancy Act(Act No. 519), which provides that:
Every
person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical
ability to work, and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some
lawful calling . . . is a vagrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal to reverse conviction of the accued should be granted?HELD: NO. The Supreme Court did not find that the claim by this able-bodied man, 33 years of age, that he was living on the charity of his mother, can be said to rebut the other evidence in the record which tended to disclose that he had no apparent means of support. He had no legal or moral claim upon his mother for support, and indeed, from the indications in the record as to the scanty means possessed by the mother, it would appear that it was his final duty to aid her rather than to call upon her for aid.
The judgment of conviction and the sentenced imposed by the trial court was affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.