RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL. G.R. No. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424 May 3, 2006
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017
Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency
and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of
terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The Office of the
President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities
related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I;
and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local
governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA. The police
arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at
the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006,
operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of
the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila
and attempt to arrest was made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS,
GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom suspected of inciting to sedition and
rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that
it encroaches the emergency powers of Congress and it violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and
assembly.
Issue:
1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?
2.) Whether
or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas and
the dispersal of KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during rallies were valid?
3.) Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as respondent in the petitions?
4.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the constitutionality of the proclamation?
5.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used?
Ruling:
1.)
The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as
it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, there were
extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power
(A) To issue decrees; ("
Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.
Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.")
(B)
To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not
related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the
President[The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military]; and
(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional.
The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislative legislation,
cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business
affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional.
2.) The
warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal
and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their
rallies are illegal, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were
committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion
and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form
of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of
the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for
publication and other materials, are declared unconstitutional because
there was no clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.
3.) It
is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the
doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is
no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.
4.) This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera,
it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have
“a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” Therefore, the
court ruled that the petitioners have a locus standi, for they
suffered “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful
search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
5.)
Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in
times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the
President may temporarily take over a privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest only if there is congressional
authority or approval. There must enactment of appropriate legislation
prescribing the terms and conditions under which the President may
exercise the powers that will serves as the best assurance that due
process of law would be observed.