ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
Administrative charge of gross immoral conduct
Facts:
Complainant
Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting for
an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court
interpreter, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a
child of eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada is not personally
related either to Escritor or her partner. Nevertheless, he filed the
charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral
act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be
allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court
condones her act.
Respondent
Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was
already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she
has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of
marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a member of
the religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower
and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity
with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living
together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness," insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is
nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and
Quilapio and they remain members in good standing in the congregation.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross and immoral conduct."
Held:
Benevolent
neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and
interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to
the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits.
Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests. It still remains
to be seen if respondent is entitled to such doctrine as the state has
not been afforded the chance has demonstrate the compelling state
interest of prohibiting the act of respondent, thus the case is remanded
to the RTC.
Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as far as it prohibits such exercise given a compelling state interest. It is the respondent’s stance that the respondent’s conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court’s action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. The Court cannot therefore simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the “compelling state interest” test. The government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the state’s compelling interest which can override respondent’s religious belief and practice.
Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as far as it prohibits such exercise given a compelling state interest. It is the respondent’s stance that the respondent’s conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court’s action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. The Court cannot therefore simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the “compelling state interest” test. The government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the state’s compelling interest which can override respondent’s religious belief and practice.