PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS DIONISIO CALONGE G.R. No. 182793, July 5, 2010
Parricide
FACTS:
Rosita A. Calonge was appellant’s legitimate wife, with whom he had three children. On December 1, 2001 at around 6:00 o’clock in the morning, the Villaverde Police Station received a radio call from the barangay captain
of Cabuluan that a massacre took place in their locality. Rosita’s
bloodied body was found lying on the ground about fifteen (15) meters
away from their house. Her right hand was loosely clasping a knife.
Lying on his back near the stairs was appellant who was also wounded but
still conscious. Beside him were a bolo and a flashlight, both stained
with blood. While the windows of the house were locked with a piece
of tie wire, the door was already opened. Inside the two “bedrooms” of
the house separated only by a curtain, they found the lifeless bodies of
the two young girls, Kimberly and Dony Rose. The other child, Melody,
was also bloodied but alive and conscious. They brought Melody to the
Veterans Regional Hospital where she was treated and confined for
seventeen days. Melody’s grandparents said they knew it was appellant
because they had heard Rosita shouting that appellant will kill them.
On the other hand, when appellant was asked what happened and who
attacked him, he answered he does not know. Appellant was charged with parricide and frustrated parricide.
ISSUE:
Is the accused guilty of the crime charged?
RULING:
YES.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased
is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused. The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. All the elements of the crime were clearly and sufficiently proved by the prosecution. Even granting arguendo
that Melody did not see the actual stabbing of her mother and two (2)
sisters, the attendant circumstances point to no one else but the
appellant as the perpetrator. Direct evidence of the actual killing is
not indispensable for convicting an accused when circumstantial evidence
can sufficiently establish his guilt. The oft-repeated rule has been
that circumstantial evidence is adequate for conviction if there is more
than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are derived
have been proven and the combination of all circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of
circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a given case, all the
circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every
other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances
proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one fair
and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, is the guilty person. In
the killing of victims in this case, the trial court was correct in
appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery. There is
treachery when the attack is so sudden and unexpected that the victim
had no opportunity either to avert the attack or to defend himself.
Indeed, nothing can be more sudden and unexpected than when a father
stabs to death his two young daughters while they were sound asleep and
totally defenseless.