People vs. Tabuelog G.R. No. 178059, January 22, 2008
Elements of Self-Defense/Murder
Facts:
An Information was filed charging appellant with murder. The accused admits that he stabbed Clinton Badinas on or about that time on said place and as a consequence of the wound he sustained Clinton Badinas died. However, he claimed that he acted in self-defense.
The trial court found the version of the prosecution credible thus rejecting appellant’s theory of self-defense. On May 6, 2005, the trial court rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty of murder.
Appellant alleges that the justifying circumstance of self-defense was not properly considered in his favor; that assuming the killing was committed not in self-defense, still the courts below erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Issue:
Elements of Self-Defense/Murder
Facts:
An Information was filed charging appellant with murder. The accused admits that he stabbed Clinton Badinas on or about that time on said place and as a consequence of the wound he sustained Clinton Badinas died. However, he claimed that he acted in self-defense.
The trial court found the version of the prosecution credible thus rejecting appellant’s theory of self-defense. On May 6, 2005, the trial court rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty of murder.
Appellant alleges that the justifying circumstance of self-defense was not properly considered in his favor; that assuming the killing was committed not in self-defense, still the courts below erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Issue:
Is appellant’s contention meritorious?
Ruling:
The petition is partly meritorious.
In invoking self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, the onus probandi is shifted to the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence all the elements of justifying circumstance, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
The accused, in cases of self-defense, must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence since he admits the commission of the alleged criminal act. One who admits the infliction of injuries which caused the death of another has the burden of proving self-defense with sufficient and convincing evidence, for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing. Self-defense, like alibi, is a defense which can easily be concocted. If the accused’s evidence is of doubtful veracity, and it is not clear and convincing, the defense must necessarily fail.
We agree with the findings of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals that the defense miserably
In the instant case, appellant failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; moreover, his narration of the events was unbelievable. As correctly observed by the trial court, considering the alleged disadvantageous position of the appellant and the relentless assault from the victim, it is surprising that appellant remained unscathed. The presence of a pitcher and a knife conveniently within the reach of appellant was highly suspect and coincidental. As noted by the trial court, "the presence of a pitcher of water which the accused picked up to repel the attack of the deceased and the knife which the accused was able to grasp and swung it to the (victim) hitting him near the left armpit seems to suggest that pitchers and knives are scattered around Fort Ilocandia."11 Moreover, if it were true that the victim was pursuing Roger Domingo with a broken bottle, then it is preposterous for the appellant to shout at and order Domingo, instead of the victim, to stop, thus putting Domingo’s life at risk. Further, if Domingo stopped as narrated by appellant, then it is inconceivable that he was not harmed by his alleged pursuer.
In fine, the trial court correctly held that the defense failed to prove the element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. There being no unlawful aggression, there is no need to discuss whether the means employed to repel the attack was reasonable or whether appellant sufficiently provoked the victim into attacking him.
However, we cannot agree with the findings of the trial court that treachery attended the commission of the crime. The trial court appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery because "the attack by the accused upon the victim was sudden and coming from behind, thus, precluding any possible way for the victim to defend himself." Nevertheless, mere suddenness of the attack does not amount to treachery.
It bears stressing that treachery cannot be presumed. It must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself. The fact that the victim might have been unaware or helpless when he was stabbed does not constitute proof of treachery. The prosecution has the burden to prove that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, method and forms of attack employed by him. In the instant case, there was no proof that appellant consciously adopted the mode of attack, hence he may only be held liable for homicide, not murder.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals finding appellant guilty of murder is MODIFIED. The Court finds appellant guilty of Homicide.
Ruling:
The petition is partly meritorious.
In invoking self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, the onus probandi is shifted to the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence all the elements of justifying circumstance, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
The accused, in cases of self-defense, must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence since he admits the commission of the alleged criminal act. One who admits the infliction of injuries which caused the death of another has the burden of proving self-defense with sufficient and convincing evidence, for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing. Self-defense, like alibi, is a defense which can easily be concocted. If the accused’s evidence is of doubtful veracity, and it is not clear and convincing, the defense must necessarily fail.
We agree with the findings of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals that the defense miserably
In the instant case, appellant failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; moreover, his narration of the events was unbelievable. As correctly observed by the trial court, considering the alleged disadvantageous position of the appellant and the relentless assault from the victim, it is surprising that appellant remained unscathed. The presence of a pitcher and a knife conveniently within the reach of appellant was highly suspect and coincidental. As noted by the trial court, "the presence of a pitcher of water which the accused picked up to repel the attack of the deceased and the knife which the accused was able to grasp and swung it to the (victim) hitting him near the left armpit seems to suggest that pitchers and knives are scattered around Fort Ilocandia."11 Moreover, if it were true that the victim was pursuing Roger Domingo with a broken bottle, then it is preposterous for the appellant to shout at and order Domingo, instead of the victim, to stop, thus putting Domingo’s life at risk. Further, if Domingo stopped as narrated by appellant, then it is inconceivable that he was not harmed by his alleged pursuer.
In fine, the trial court correctly held that the defense failed to prove the element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. There being no unlawful aggression, there is no need to discuss whether the means employed to repel the attack was reasonable or whether appellant sufficiently provoked the victim into attacking him.
However, we cannot agree with the findings of the trial court that treachery attended the commission of the crime. The trial court appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery because "the attack by the accused upon the victim was sudden and coming from behind, thus, precluding any possible way for the victim to defend himself." Nevertheless, mere suddenness of the attack does not amount to treachery.
It bears stressing that treachery cannot be presumed. It must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself. The fact that the victim might have been unaware or helpless when he was stabbed does not constitute proof of treachery. The prosecution has the burden to prove that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, method and forms of attack employed by him. In the instant case, there was no proof that appellant consciously adopted the mode of attack, hence he may only be held liable for homicide, not murder.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals finding appellant guilty of murder is MODIFIED. The Court finds appellant guilty of Homicide.