People
of the Phil. Vs. Zaldy Garcia Y Ancheta
G.R. No.174479, June 17, 2008
G.R. No.174479, June 17, 2008
Digested Case (Case Digest) in Criminal Law
Crime of murder qualified by treachery
Crime of murder qualified by treachery
The prosecution charged the accused-appellant Zaldy Garcia y Ancheta for the murder of Major Opina qualified by treachery, attended by the special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm, under two separate informations. The charge for violating R.A. 6425 is no longer under review after the RTC acquitted the appellant on ground of reasonable doubt. On arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges laid.
On August 26, 2003, the RTC convicted the accused of the crime of murder. The case was elevated to this Court on automatic appeal but was remanded to the Court of Appeals (CA) in accordance with People v. Mateo. The CA decision of May 31, 2006 affirmed with modification the RTC decision.
In his brief, the appellant argues that the RTC erred –
1. in convicting him after the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt;
2. in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery;
3. in failing to recognize the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in imposing the penalty.
Issue:
Should the appeal be granted?
Ruling:
No. Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
The appellant contends, as his first point, that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt; no one really testified that it was he who shot Major Opina.
We clarify at the outset that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not solely established by direct evidence. In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may present circumstantial evidence that, under given conditions, may meet the evidentiary standard of "proof beyond reasonable doubt" in criminal cases. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The conclusions that can be drawn from the chain of proven circumstances rather than their number are material to prove the guilt of the accused. What is paramount is that facts be proven from which inferences may be drawn - with all the circumstances being consistent with one other - that the accused is guilty and this inference is consistent with no other conclusion except that of guilt.
The records of this case show that evidence of who actually shot Major Opina is not lacking. In fact, the evidence is the strongest there is, as the appellant himself admitted in open court that he was the one who wielded the gun and pulled the trigger.
The Presence of Treachery
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, method or forms which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the defense that the offended party might make.
To constitute treachery, two conditions must concur: (1) the employment of means, methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offender’s safety from any defense or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party; and (2) the offender’s deliberate or conscious choice of the means, method or manner of execution.
The appellant seeks to negate these elements of treachery by claiming to have acted out of fear and nervousness; he was allegedly under these stresses because persons who were armed, dressed in civilian clothes and who did not identify themselves as members of the police, scaled his fence. He simply reacted to the intrusion and had no plan to shoot one of those who so approached his house. Hence, he concludes that there was no treachery and the killing could not have been attended by this qualifying circumstance. He posits that the court a quo should have recognized all these.
What are the undisputed facts?
First, it is not disputed that the appellant went out of his house to see for himself the two men who came. Second, by his own testimony, he returned to his house to get his gun. Third, no immediate shooting took place. The two policemen still called for backup assistance, waited and conferred on what to do, and only after the backup came did they scale the fence. Twenty minutes must have elapsed from the time the appellant went inside the house up to the time of the actual shooting. Fourth, Major Opina was almost at the door of the appellant’s house when the shot that killed him rang out. Fifth, the shot came from inside the house through a closed chicken wire screen door that effectively hid a man from inside the house from someone from the outside. Sixth, the first and fatal shot was sudden, immediately hitting Major Opina.
We conclude from all these established facts that indeed treachery had attended the killing of Major Opina. While the original initiative originated from the police who sought to arrest the appellant, the latter’s response was an attack which showed, by its method and manner, that it did not come at the spur of the moment. The appellant was duly forewarned about the identities of Major Opina and SPO4 Oriña. Not only was he forewarned, he had ample time to reflect on what to do. His immediate response was to arm himself and to lie in wait – in ambush, literally - and to fire from a position of concealment and relative safety at the two policemen who were fully exposed and in the open at the time. The shooting distance of a little more than a meter effectively gave Major Opina no chance. This, in our view, is a classic example of treachery under the definition of the Revised Penal Code of the term.
Voluntary Surrender
The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture. Without these reasons and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender is the inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure his safety, the surrender cannot be spontaneous and cannot be the "voluntary surrender" that serves as a mitigating circumstance.
Again, to hark back to the undisputed facts, no surrender immediately took place after the shooting of Major Opina; what followed was an exchange of shots between the appellant and SPO4 Oriña, after which the appellant holed out in his kitchen for some two to three hours. It was only after negotiations with Chief Inspector Lusad that he gave himself up. Thus, SPO3 Benavidez testified that the negotiation was "quite long." SPO4 Oriña, on the other hand, testified that the appellant even made demands before he surrendered. When he did surrender, the police had been in place for some time, fully surrounding his house so that he could not have escaped without a major and direct confrontation with them. Then, too, he did not acknowledge liability for the killing of Major Opina even after his surrender to Chief Inspector Lusad. Under these circumstances, none of the attendant elements that would make the surrender a mitigating circumstance was present. The appellant surrendered simply because there was no other way out without risking his own life and limb in a battle with the police.