MALACAT vs. CA
Facts:
Petitioner was arrested
for having in his possession a hand grenade after he was searched by a group of
policemen when he was said to be acting suspiciously when he was hanging around
Plaza Miranda with his eyes moving fast together with other Muslim-looking men.
When the policemen approached the group of men, they scattered in all
directions which prompted the police to give chase and petitioner was then
apprehended and a search was made on his person.
He was then
convicted under PD 1866 in the lower court. Hence, the present petition wherein
petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that the search made
on him and the seizure of the hand grenade from him was an appropriate incident
to his arrest and that it erred in admitting the hand grenade as evidence since
it was admissible because it was a product of an unreasonable and illegal
search.
Issue: WON the search
and seizure conducted by the police was valid.
Held:
The general rule as
regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to
validly effect the same. 31 The Constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a
validly issued warrant, 32 subject to certain exceptions. As
regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. — Arrest, without warrant; when
lawful — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped . . .
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances
contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in
flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described
as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they
are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving
vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; 33 (5) a search incidental to a lawful
arrest;34 and
(6) a "stop and frisk.’
At
the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a
"stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These
two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of
proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a
search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the
validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in
a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. 36 In this
instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search
can be made — the process cannot be reversed. 37 At bottom, assuming a valid arrest,
the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within
which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize
any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or
the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might
furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.
We
now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a
"stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer
clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry,
thus:
We merely hold today that where a police
officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in
the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman
and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety,
he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct
a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt
to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . .
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable
cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of
the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk"
serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer
may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and
self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.