ROGELIO P. NOGALES, for himself and on behalf of the minors, ROGER ANTHONY, ANGELICA, NANCY, and MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER, all surnamed NOGALES, petitioners, vs. CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, DR. OSCAR ESTRADA, DR. ELY VILLAFLOR, DR. ROSA UY, DR. JOEL ENRIQUEZ, DR. PERPETUA LACSON, DR. NOE ESPINOLA, and NURSE J. DUMLAO, respondents.
G.R. No. 142625 December 19, 2006
Constructive dismissal is an involuntary resignation resulting in cessation of work resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to an employee.
FACTS:
Francisco was hired as Accountant and Corporate Secretary of Kasei Corp. and was assigned to handle all the accounting needs of the company. She was also designated as Liaison Officer to the City of Makati to secure permits and other licenses for the initial operation of the company. Although she was designated as Corporate Secretary, she was not entrusted with the corporate documents; neither did she attend any board meeting nor required to do so.
After a year, she was then designated as the Acting Manager – assigned to handle recruitment of all employees and perform management administration functions; represent the company in all dealings with government agencies; and to administer all other matters pertaining to the operation of Kasei Restaurant which is owned and operated by Kasei Corporation.
After a few years, she was replaced by Fuentes as Manager. Thereafter, her salary was reduced by P2,500.00 a month until September. She was not paid her salary on the following month because she is no longer connected with the company. Since she was no longer paid her salary, she did not report for work and filed an action for constructive dismissal before the labor arbiter.
Corp’s Contentions:
• Francisco is not its employee since she performed her work at her own discretion without control and supervision of Kasei Corporation. Petitioner had no daily time record and she came to the office any time she wanted. The company never interfered with her work except that from time to time, the management would ask her opinion on matters relating to her profession.
• Petitioner's designation as technical consultant depended solely upon the will of management. As such, her consultancy may be terminated any time considering that her services were only temporary in nature and dependent on the needs of the corporation.
• Petitioner was not among the employees reported to the BIR. SSS records were also submitted showing that petitioner's latest employer was Seiji Corporation.
LA: Francisco was illegally dismissed.
NLRC: affirmed LA.
CA: reversed NLRC.
CA (motion for reconsideration): denied.
ISSUES:
1. WON there was an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private respondent Kasei Corporation; and if in the affirmative.
2. WON petitioner was illegally dismissed.
RULING:
1.Yes. In this jurisdiction, there has been no uniform test to determine the existence of an employer-employee relation. Generally, courts have relied on the so-called right of control test where the person for whom the services are performed reserves a right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end. In addition to the standard of right-of-control, the existing economic conditions prevailing between the parties, like the inclusion of the employee in the payrolls, can help in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship. However, in certain cases the control test is not sufficient to give a complete picture of the relationship between the parties, owing to the complexity of such a relationship where several positions have been held by the worker. Thus, the better approach would be to adopt a two-tiered test involving: (1) the putative employer's power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished (Control Test); and (2) the underlying economic realities of the activity or relationship (Economic Conditions).
By applying the control test, there is no doubt that petitioner is an employee of Kasei Corporation because she was under the direct control and supervision of Seiji Kamura, the corporation's Technical Consultant. She reported for work regularly and served in various capacities as Accountant, Liaison Officer, Technical Consultant, Acting Manager and Corporate Secretary, with substantially the same job functions, that is, rendering accounting and tax services to the company and performing functions necessary and desirable for the proper operation of the corporation such as securing business permits and other licenses over an indefinite period of engagement.
The proper standard of economic dependence is whether the worker is dependent on the alleged employer for his continued employment in that line of business. Under the broader economic reality test, the petitioner can likewise be said to be an employee of respondent corporation because she had served the company for six years before her dismissal, receiving check vouchers indicating her salaries/wages, benefits, 13th month pay, bonuses and allowances, as well as deductions and Social Security contributions from August 1, 1999 to December 18, 2000.
2. Yes, she was illegally dismissed. A diminution of pay, which happened when her salary was reduced to P2,500 per month, is prejudicial to the employee and amounts to her constructive dismissal. Constructive dismissal is an involuntary resignation resulting in cessation of work resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to an employee.
6. Nogales et al., vs. Capitol Medical Center et al., G.R. No. 142625, December 19, 2006
CONCEPT: For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital; (2) where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and (3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
FACTS:
Corazon Nogales, who was pregnant, was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Estrada. While Corazon was on her last trimester of pregnancy, Dr. Estrada noted an increase in her blood pressure and development of leg edema indicating preeclampsia, which is a dangerous complication of pregnancy. When Nogales started to experience mild labor pains, she and her spouse prompted to see Dr. Estrada at his home. After examining, he advised her immediate admission to the Capitol Medical Center (“CMC”). Upon admission at the CMC, Rogelio Nogales, her husband, executed and signed the “Consent on Admission and Agreement” and “Admission Agreement.” Corazon Nogales died after giving birth due to “hemorrhage, post partum.”
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages with the RTC of Manila against CMC, Dr. Estrada, and the rest of CMC medical staff for her death. In their defense, CMC pointed out that Dr. Estrada was a consultant to be considered as an independent-contractor, and that no employer-employee relationship existed between the former and the latter.
RTC: Dr. Estrada solely liable for damages.
CA: affirmed the RTC’s ruling.
ISSUE:
WON CMC is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Estrada even if he is an independent contractor.
RULING:
Yes.
In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-physician. There is, however, an exception to this principle – the "doctrine of apparent authority." Under this doctrine, a hospital can be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a physician providing care at the hospital, regardless of whether the physician is an independent contractor, unless the patient knows, or should have known, that the physician is an independent contractor. For a hospital to be liable under the said doctrine, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital; (2) where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and (3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence."
The doctrine of apparent authority essentially involves two factors to determine the liability of an independent-contractor physician.
The first factor focuses on the hospital's manifestations and is sometimes described as an inquiry whether the hospital acted in a manner which would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital. In this regard, the hospital need not make express representations to the patient that the treating physician is an employee of the hospital; rather a representation may be general and implied.
In the instant case, CMC impliedly held out Dr. Estrada as a member of its medical staff. Through CMC's acts, CMC clothed Dr. Estrada with apparent authority thereby leading the Spouses Nogales to believe that Dr. Estrada was an employee or agent of CMC. First, CMC granted staff privileges to Dr. Estrada. It extended its medical staff and facilities to him. Upon his request for Corazon's admission, CMC, through its personnel, readily accommodated Corazon and updated Dr. Estrada of her condition. Second, CMC made Rogelio sign consent forms printed on CMC letterhead. Prior to Corazon's admission and supposed hysterectomy, CMC asked Rogelio to sign release forms, the contents of which reinforced Rogelio's belief that Dr. Estrada was a member of CMC's medical staff.
The second factor focuses on the patient's reliance. It is sometimes characterized as an inquiry on whether the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence. In this case, Rogelio testified that he and his wife specifically chose Dr. Estrada to handle Corazon’s delivery because of Dr. Estrada’s connection with a reputable hospital, which is the CMC. In other words, Dr. Estrada’s relationship with CMC played a significant role in the spouses’ decision in accepting Dr. Estrada’s services as the ob-gyne for Corazon’s delivery. Moreover, as earlier stated, there is no showing that before and during Corazon’s confinement at CMC, the Spouses Nogales knew or should have known that Dr. Estrada was not an employee of CMC. CMC’s defense that all it did was “to extend to Corazon its facilities” is untenable. The Court cannot close its eyes to the reality that hospitals, such as CMC, are in the business of treatment.