People vs Ong
G.R. No. 137348
June 21, 2004
Criminal Case Digest
G.R. No. 137348
June 21, 2004
Criminal Case Digest
Facts:
Based on prosecution through the testimony of SPO1 Rodolfo S. Gonzales, in the afternoon of July 23, 1998, a confidential informant (CI) of the Special Operations Division (SOD), PNP Narcotics Group, reported to Chief Inspector Albert Ignatius D. Ferro about the alleged illicit drug activities of accused William Ong and Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu. As per order of Chief Inspector Ferro, a team of eight decided to conduct a buy-bust operation. Once, CI confirmed the meeting time and venue with the drug dealer, and exchanges of gift-wrapped packages rendered of one (1) sealed plastic bag with a white crystalline substance by the accused Ong and boodle money placed in a “W. Brown” plastic bag by SPO1 Gonzales, thereafter, the latter arrested Ong while the CI and the back-up agents arrested co-accused De Ming.
The two (2) accused were brought to the police office where the corresponding booking sheets and arrest report were prepared. The plastic bag containing the illegal drug substance, was referred to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination, positive for methyl amphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
However, the appellants denied the story of the prosecution. Accused William Ong, a Chinese citizen from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), claimed that he came to the Philippines in 1997 to look for a job. Initially, he worked in a pancit factory in Quezon City, but later hunted for another job, was referred by his friend Kian Ling to Ong Sin for a possible job as a technician in a bihon factory owned by Sin. Subsequently, without any knowledge of his new job, William Ong was later taken to the police station and there he met the other accused Ching De Ming for the first time. He maintained innocence to the crime charged.
On his part, accused Ching De Ming testified that he is a legitimate businessman engaged in the RTW business. On that same date of the commission of the crime, while waiting for his girlfriend and her mother, whose mother Avenlina Cardoz, testified in De Ming’s favor and corroborated with his story, that he was approached by persons unknown to him. He was misidentified as one of the accused and dragged him out of his car and brought to the other car, took his clutch bag, then after a few hours, at Camp Crame, they removed his blindfold. He denied knowing Ong and the charge of conspiring with him to deliver shabu in New Manila, Quezon City.
On November 18, 1998 the trial court convicted appellants as charged and imposed on them the penalty of death. It likewise ordered each of them to pay a fine of P1 million pesos. However, the case was on automatic review. Appellants insist on their innocence. They claim that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue:
(a) Whether or not the arraignment of appellants violates Rule 116, Section (a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure?
Held:
The aforementioned provision on Arraignment and Plea provides that (a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge of clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.
The trial court held that the arraignment of appellants violated the above rule. Appellants are Chinese nationals. Their Certificate of Arraignment states that they were informed of the accusations against them. It does not, however, indicate whether the information was read in the language or dialect known to them.
Both accused Ong and De Ming were arraigned, assisted by counsel de parte, and both entered a plea of not guilty. From the records, it was clear that appellants only knew the Chinese language, however the appellants were arraigned on an information written in the English language. The requirement that the information should be read in a language or dialect known to the accused is mandatory. It must be strictly complied with as it is intended to protect the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause the of the accusation against him. The constitutional protection is part of due process. Failure to observe the rules necessarily nullifies the arraignment. After the arraignment and in the course of the trial, the lower court had to secure the services of a certain Richard Ng Lee as Chinese interpreter.
Hence, it is abundantly clear that it was the CI who made the initial contact, and he was likewise the one who closed the deal with accused William Ong, and set the venue and time of the meeting. Since only the CI had personal knowledge of the offer to purchase shabu, the court held that SPO1 Gonzales is, in effect, not the “poseur-buyer” but merely the deliveryman. His testimony therefore on material points of the sale of shabu is hearsay and standing alone cannot be the basis of the conviction of the appellants.
The buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has been accepted as a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. However, to determine whether there was valid entrapment or whether proper procedures were undertaken by the police officers, in effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure that the details of the operation are clearly and adequately laid out through relevant, material and competent evidence.
In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust operation is incomplete. The confidential information who had sole knowledge of how the alleged illegal sale of shabu started and how it was perfected was not presented as a witness. His testimony was given instead by SPO1 Gonzales who had no personal knowledge of the same and not part of the buy-bust operation.
Although, the court is sharply aware of the compelling considerations why confidential informants are usually not presented by the prosecution. Likewise, once the identity of the informer has been disclosed to those who would have cause to resent the communication, the privilege is no longer applicable.
In sum, there is no fixed rule with respect to disclosure of the identity of an informer. The problem has to be resolved on a case to case basis and calls for balancing the state interest in protecting the people from crimes against the individual’s right to prepare his defense. The balance must be adjusted by giving due weight to the following factors, among others: (1) the crime charged, (2) the possible defenses, (3) the possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and (4) other relevant factors.
In the present case, the crime charged against the appellants is capital in character and can result in the imposition of the death penalty. The prosecution has to prove all the material elements of the alleged sale of shabu and the resulting buy-bust operation. Where the testimony of the informer is indispensable. It should be disclosed. The liberty and the life of a person enjoy high importance in our scale of values. It cannot be diminished except by a value of higher significance. Moreover, the mishandling and transfer of custody of the alleged confiscated methyl amphetamine hydrochloride further shattered the case of the prosecution. There is no crime of illegal sale of regulated drug when there is a nagging doubt on whether the substance confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be regulated drug.
The court decided to reverse and set aside its former decision. Appellants Ong and De Ming @ Tiu are acquitted of the crime of the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and are ordered immediately released from custody unless held for some other lawful cause.
